An Assessment of New York State's Disaster Food Stamp Benefits Program

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is no question about the commitment and dedication of all of the people involved in the development and implementation of the disaster food stamp benefit program (DFSBP) in New York City after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Everyone, including USDA officials, NYS Governor’s staff, OTDA officials, NYC HRA officials and the advocate community, did a tremendous job in trying to design and implement the best possible program.

As the reader will see, many things were done well, and should be emulated. At the same time, any endeavor of this magnitude will, of necessity, have gaps and opportunities for improvement that can be identified in a retrospective review.

With great respect to all involved, we make this attempt to assist other planners, federal, state and local administrators, policy makers and community advocates in their efforts to develop responsive disaster food stamp benefit programs, by providing in this report a description of New York’s DFSBP development and implementation, so that the many things that were done well can be replicated, and by offering the recommendations cited below (and described in greater detail in this report).

1. The most important lesson learned from NYC’s experience is that when requesting waivers to implement a DFSBP, states should ask for flexibility to allow all households impacted by the disaster to be potentially eligible for benefits. Under the Food Stamp Act, USDA has very broad authority in approving waivers for the establishment of DFSBPs; states should seek approval for the broadest eligibility criteria necessary.

2. Geographic designation for eligibility is not a requirement of the Food Stamp Act and should only be used if it will meet the needs of those affected by the disaster.

3. While a declaration of a national disaster is the initial trigger for the establishment of a DFSBP, the ‘levels’ of designation are not pertinent to the potential inclusion of an area within the disaster food stamp plan.

4. While it is important for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to know about and to promote the DFSBP, the DFSBP must have a home of its own, separate from other disaster benefits, in order to assure speedy processing of DFSBP applications.

5. To better get the word out, FEMA should work with the USDA to integrate food assistance generally and the DFSBP specifically into the overall disaster response. FEMA should include information about the DFSBP during intake interviews and in the various pieces of literature they distribute. Also, the DFSBP should be publicized separately from other disaster assistance programs.

6. Outreach is essential. All forms of media should be used to get the word out, especially radio. Officials interviewed by the news media should mention disaster food stamps specifically, not just assistance generally. News releases and public service announcements should tell people where to go and what to bring to apply. Supermarkets, churches, community centers, low-wage employers, and community-based organizations should also be utilized to spread information.

7. The program must be allowed to operate for as long as necessary to meet the needs of disaster victims.

8. EBT contracts should include provisions for actions to support the delivery of food stamps (and other benefits) during disasters.

9. An available disaster fund checkbook is essential and can be repaid from private funds raised subsequently in response to the disaster.

10. Specific plans for the transition of eligible households from a disaster food stamp benefit program to regular food stamps must be laid before the closure of the program. Follow-through implementation, including the sharing of information with the advocacy community is also essential.

11. Lessons learned about the positive and supportive atmosphere in the delivery of disaster food stamp services to clients should be applied to the administration of the regular Food Stamp Program. Households experiencing "personal disasters" are no less deserving of good treatment and encouraging support in applying for the federal nutrition assistance designed to serve them.

INTRODUCTION

The disaster food stamp benefits program (DFSBP) is designed to quickly provide food assistance to households who lose food or have limited access to food as a result of a declared state of emergency. It is authorized by Congress as part of the Food Stamp Act, granting USDA broad authority to waive Food Stamp Program eligibility, documentation, and administrative requirements "as appropriate" under the circumstances.

It has mostly been used, as it was in New York State a few years ago, for more "traditional," weather-related disasters. It was put to a new test in September. The good news is that because of the action of the New York State Office for Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA), the USDA, and New York City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), nearly 12,000 new applicant households received a total of $3.8 million in disaster food stamp benefits, and another 3,400 households received replacement/supplemental benefits.

However, thousands of eligible households did not receive benefits. About 10,000 households were automatically eligible for replacement benefits, yet only 3,400 received them. USDA, OTDA, and HRA officials do not know exactly how many additional people were eligible or why they did not get benefits. It is possible that the food needs of these households were met in other ways, that they did not know benefits were available, or that they were unable to apply for the benefits.

Despite all of the difficulties experienced in New York City as a result of the terrorist attacks, the disaster food stamp program was established and operating within one week. A Red Cross supervisor said of the Family Assistance Center where she was working, "With all the things that have gone wrong, it’s amazing that anything is working." The same might be said of the disaster food stamp program. With all the obstacles administrators had to overcome, a lot of hard work went into ensuring the program was quickly available to thousands of people in need.

It is unfortunate that we live in a time when we can anticipate that this kind of attack may be repeated. However, if such an occasion does arise, authorities and advocates can benefit from the hard-earned experience in New York. In order to make NYC’s experience with the disaster food stamp program available, we interviewed those involved and reviewed records of applications and issuances of disaster benefits. Most importantly, we asked those involved for honest critiques of both their own and others’ effectiveness and recommendations for how the system could be improved in the future. The report that follows provides background about the disaster food stamp program and the regular Food Stamp Program, describes the operation of the disaster food stamp program in NYC after September 11, and offers recommendations for use in planning future disaster food stamp program responses.

The Food Stamp Program in New York State and New York City

The Food Stamp Program (FSP) is a state-administered federal nutrition assistance program. Federal law governs the criteria for eligibility and levels of benefits. Each state is responsible for determining and documenting eligibility, issuing benefits, and maintaining records. The state and federal governments share operating costs, but the value of the benefits themselves is completely reimbursed by the federal government. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the program at the national level.

At the state level, the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA) oversees the local administration of the Food Stamp Program. Most administrative functions are delegated to counties through local districts of social services (LDSSs). In New York City, the Human Resources Administration (HRA) administers the Food Stamp Program.

Since the spring of 2000, food stamp benefits in NYC have been issued through the Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) system. Under EBT, participants get a card similar to a credit card, which they can swipe through machines at the checkout counters of grocery stores. The cost of their groceries is then debited from their food stamp benefit account. The cards may be mailed to the household or picked up from two locations, one in Brooklyn and one in Manhattan.

Between 1996 and 2001, FSP participation in NYC dropped by 44 percent. While this decrease mirrored a similar decrease throughout the nation, it was significantly larger than the 35 percent decline in the rest of New York State. In late 2000 and early 2001, there were signs that the decline in upstate and the rest of the nation was slowing or even reversing itself. However, that was not the case in NYC; throughout 2001, the decline continued.

This continuing decline may be due in part to increased efforts to remove people from TANF (the federal cash assistance program). The first TANF five-year time limits went into effect in December, and almost 33,000 people in New York City left TANF between September 1, 2001 and December 1, 2001. Most households remaining in need of cash assistance on December 1 were converted to the state- and locally-financed Safety Net Assistance (SNA) Program, but intense efforts were employed to transition as many people as possible off of any form of cash assistance.

The Food Stamp Act’s Disaster Food Stamp Benefits Program

The disaster food stamp benefits program (DFSBP) is authorized by Section 5 of the Food Stamp Act of 1997 as amended in December 2000.

The strength of the statute is that it recognizes that every disaster is unique, and grants USDA broad discretion in crafting an appropriate response for each situation. The authorizing language for the DFSBP is very broad (see Attachment 1). The statute provides for the establishment of "temporary emergency standards of eligibility for the duration of the emergency…" By maintaining a requirement for standards, the program retains its nature as a needs-based program. It is not enough for one to just be a victim of the disaster one must also meet certain criteria of need. However, the language of the statute does not limit USDA’s discretion in establishing different eligibility standards under different emergency situations.

For households that are defined as victims of the disaster, the statute provides for three categories of assistance; temporary benefits for new, non-food stamp households, replacement / enhanced benefits for food lost by food stamp participants, and relaxed reporting and application requirements. USDA may determine the exact nature of these benefits in accordance with the circumstances of the disaster.

Various forms of emergency assistance become available when the President, at the request of the Governor of a state, declares a disaster in a specific area. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the agency responsible for administering federal disaster assistance, publishes the presidential declaration in the Federal Register. The presidential declaration may specify counties covered or it may include an entire state, leaving it to FEMA to clarify the exact area and benefits it will provide, and this triggers the opportunity for the establishment of a DFSBP.

But, not every disaster situation will merit the implementation of a DFSBP. USDA has frequently used the DFSBP for natural disasters such as flooding, earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and blizzards. While FEMA declares about 50 emergencies every year, only about 5 per year require implementation of a disaster food stamp program. For the others, it is determined that there is no need for the DFSBP, although USDA might contribute commodities if they deem it appropriate. For example, after September 11, a DFSBP was authorized for New York City but not for Washington D.C., despite the fact that the Pentagon was also a terrorist target.

In order for a disaster food stamp program to be established, states must request a waiver from USDA to allow them to issue the emergency food stamps in areas affected by a presidentially declared disaster.

Before September 11, both New York State and New York City had generalized disaster plans in place, and OTDA had developed a disaster food stamp plan. USDA has a "Guide to Disaster Food Stamps" and a supplemental "Guide to Disaster EBT " (available on the USDA website at www.fns.usda.gov/disasters). OTDA was in the process of revising their emergency disaster recovery plan, but it was not finished by September 11.

A "Typical" Disaster Food Stamp Program Response

USDA has supervised dozens of disaster food stamp programs, and, while every one is different, the same basic pattern usually emerges in the aftermath of a disaster. According to USDA officials with extensive experience in disaster recovery, the implementation of a disaster food stamp program generally occurs as follows:

• The disaster occurs. There may be some warning, as in the case of hurricanes and floods, which enables local officials to do some preparation before the actual event.

• Representatives of USDA, the state administering agency, and localities meet, in person or by telephone, to discuss the circumstances and food assistance needs. These meetings may be hourly in the beginning and continue on a regular basis thereafter. Whatever personal and political differences may have existed before the disaster are left at the door and everyone is focused on getting the job done.

• A disaster food stamp program "czar" emerges. Fairly early in the process, a state or local person emerges as the one who will take responsibility for the DFSBP. Everyone must buy into this person's leadership and cooperate with this person.

• Within a couple of days, a plan is agreed upon, the state submits a waiver request, and USDA approves it.

• Within a few days of the event, one or more locations for operating the DFSBP are set up. Staff people are borrowed from other areas of the state or from other states to operate the sites.

• The program is publicized through the media, flyers, community organizations, and door to door visits (if the affected area is geographically small).

• People come in and apply for a couple of weeks. The first few days are rough as the kinks are worked out and workers trained, after that things go smoothly and processing each person takes only five or ten minutes. Each site can process thousands of applications each day.

• Ideally, in one visit, an application is processed, an eligibility determination is made, and benefits are issued. Sometimes a return visit might be necessary. People are given information about how to get ongoing food stamp benefits at the time of the initial visit.

• After a few weeks, when the emergency is stabilized, the number of applicants declines and it becomes clear that most needs have been met. If there is more than one location, the smaller ones usually close first and the others cease operating shortly thereafter.

• All of the DFSBP sites close and everybody goes home.

The DFSBP and the WTC Disaster

Many events, such as hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and blizzards, are part of the normal cycles of nature. In these cases, the needs are clearly defined and can be anticipated. States can have very specific plans in place, based on experience, to deal with the kind of damage that usually occurs.

The WTC situation demonstrated the need to prepare for contingencies that prior to September 11 could not be imagined, a much more daunting task than previous DFSBP planning had faced.

There was no warning and the magnitude of the emergency was beyond compare. It was also unusual because it was not a natural disaster. This makes no difference as far as the benefits available are concerned, but it made a big difference to the people affected and those providing relief.

The disruptions in air service and communications were also unprecedented. All transportation in and out of the area was affected in unpredictable ways. There were widespread disruptions in utilities and communications services affecting parts of the local area as well as neighboring counties. Not only were people displaced from their homes, tens of thousands of people were permanently displaced from their jobs, and thousands of people were missing and presumed dead.

Furthermore, the disaster itself was a direct attack on the country’s major economic institutions, disrupting commerce, and resulting in the immediate, permanent or temporary unemployment of workers from all income levels. "Economic loss disaster assistance is not normally the driving program," said a FEMA representative. "Here it's the engine instead of the caboose. Normally there might be 6 or 7 [people losing jobs] maybe 100, if a plant got wiped out. Economic assistance hardly ever is the program that is carrying the majority of the applicants." This has certainly been true for the blizzards and ice storms to which New York is accustomed. Businesses open up again within days, and people return to their jobs. But the economic impact of the 9/11 disaster was impossible to comprehend in the hours and days following the attack, and even now is not fully understood. In January almost 1,000 people per day were still coming to the assistance centers, about half of them for the first time. A study by the Milken Institute released in January estimated that the New York City area lost 44,000 jobs in 2001, with almost 300,000 more expected to be lost.

On September 11, there was immediate, massive unemployment from the many businesses and services housed in the WTC complex and the surrounding environs. In addition, various forms of communication were interrupted or destroyed as a result of the building collapses. Verizon, the main communications provider in New York City, lost its major trunk lines, back up trunk lines and emergency response center in WTC7. As a result, all of lower Manhattan, much of Brooklyn, and pockets throughout the city and surrounding areas lost phone service. While not as severely affected, AT&T, another communications provider, had problems as well. Not only phone service, but also the computer networks that run through the phone lines, worked sporadically and unpredictably. Some places had full services while others had nothing.

Beyond providing telephone and fax services to the city, Verizon also carried the state’s Welfare Management System (WMS), the computer system for the Food Stamp Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Safety Net Assistance (SNA -- New York State's general assistance program). Many of the servers used by retailers to process EBT transactions relied on Verizon.

The WMS system itself was not destroyed, but it was unavailable to many HRA offices. Even though many surrounding counties use a different WMS system, since their system was routed through WTC7 also, Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island and the counties north of the City (Delaware, Duchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster, and Westchester) were affected to varying degrees. WMS service to Broome County, 200 miles to the west, was also routed through WTC7 and went down with the building.

Since Verizon never uses its full capacity, they used the excess capacity to quickly rechannel the lines that were disrupted. However, when they got connected again the system was overloaded and service was not reliable.

Internet service naturally depended on the availability of the Internet service provider. Likewise, voice mail services depended on the location of the provider. As a result, while HRA offices had no phone service, their voice mail, which happens to be routed through Denver, worked perfectly and was the primary means of communication for HRA staff for the first few days.

The unusual nature of the emergency itself caused problems for the voluntary agencies, which found that they did not know what assistance to offer. Initially there was a focus on the missing people and their family members, while the displaced, who would ordinarily be the primary victims of a disaster, were relegated to secondary victim status. Many people who lost jobs or were evacuated from their homes did not seek assistance because they felt that those who lost family members had a greater need.

FEMA and voluntary agencies, the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, have broad experience with floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes. In those cases, much of the assistance needed is for people temporarily displaced from their homes. In New York, there were not a lot of people who were completely without a place to stay, because most people in Battery Park City, the residential area next to the WTC, had resources. They stayed in hotels, which offered special rates for displaced people, they stayed with friends and family, and they used their savings before seeking assistance.

Developing the Disaster Food Stamp Plan for NYC

On September 11th, the President declared a state of emergency for New York City. FEMA immediately extended all categories of assistance to the five boroughs of the city. At that time, the outlying counties, as well as New Jersey and Connecticut were not included in the disaster area. (On September 28, a state of emergency was extended to these areas.)

As the events of September 11 unfolded, many of the people who would make decisions about and run the DFSBP were in their lower Manhattan offices. They were forced to decide when to evacuate and where to go. They were trying to locate their children, families, and staff members to make sure everyone was all right. They were caught in the same disbelief and horror as the rest of the population, not wanting to believe that anyone could deliberately cause such destruction.

Most city government offices were located in the evacuated area, and staff was unable to coordinate on the 11th. In a scenario repeated all over the City by people ranging from not-for-profit organizations to Wall Street firms, some senior HRA staff, including Commissioner Turner, found themselves in the HRA headquarters offices at 180 Water Street without telephones, computers or electricity asking themselves what people would need, evaluating the resources available, and informally planning possible responses.

During the course of the first day, OTDA staff in Albany reviewed the waivers that were granted during the ice storms and spoke with representatives of USDA's regional office in Boston. It was clear that a state of emergency would be declared, and discussion about the DFSBP began immediately.

On September 12th and 13th, USDA and OTDA staff began to develop a plan to keep the current Food Stamp Program running smoothly and to meet the immediate food assistance needs caused by the disaster.

A series of conference calls regarding the DFSBP were made between the USDA Regional Office, OTDA, HRA, representatives of the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) and sometimes the Mayor's Office. These calls occurred at least daily for about three weeks, after which they became less frequent.

USDA staff explained to OTDA the parameters of what they thought was possible under the DFSBP. Specifically, USDA told OTDA that the disaster food stamp program could only be established for areas within the declared emergency area - the five boroughs of New York City. Also, the program could be used to provide benefits up to the maximum monthly food stamp allotment for households directly affected by the emergency, and the program should operate only for a very limited time.

Within that framework, USDA asserted that they had broad authority to do what was necessary to distribute benefits to affected people, including waiving documentation requirements and expanding eligibility. In addition, USDA's regular waiver authority could be used as needed to accommodate the special circumstances faced by any area of the state. For example, areas that had lost access to WMS could seek a waiver to extend the timeframes within which they must process certain changes. USDA did not limit this waiver authority to the disaster area, since it was not technically part of the disaster food stamp program.

New York’s Disaster Food Stamp Waiver

In order to implement a DFSBP, the state had to submit a request for waivers to USDA for approval. OTDA took primary responsibility for developing the waiver request, in consultation with USDA and city representatives. Through numerous conference calls, the details were worked out. OTDA submitted a written request for a waiver on Friday, September 14th and USDA approved it on the following day.

The request asked for assistance in three areas: disaster food stamp benefits for non-food stamp households that were affected by the disaster, replacement and supplements for current food stamp households that were affected by the disaster, and waivers to allow more time for routine case processing activities.

Specifically, the approved waivers provided for the following (see Attachment 2):

For Ongoing Food Stamp Households

Replacement of the September food stamp allotment for current food stamp households: Households living in Manhattan below 14^th Street who received food stamps and reported a loss of food because of the WTC attacks were eligible to receive full replacement of their September allotment. These households were eligible for replacement of their September allotment provided they made a request for replacement benefits prior to October 15, 2001.

Ordinarily, households are required to go to the local district food stamp office to file a report of food lost due to client misfortune. After receiving a signed statement, the district replaces up to a maximum of the client's most recent allocation. This waiver allowed NYC to accept a verbal report of loss of food, by telephone or in person, and replace that issuance up to 100% of the September allotment for clients of centers below 14th Street, the area most directly impacted by the emergency. Because of the magnitude of the disaster and the timing of the disaster coinciding with the end of the staggered issuance cycle, it was assumed that all households in this area would need replacement of food at least up to the monthly benefit level. OTDA estimated that there were somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000 food stamp households in the area south of 14th Street.

In some previous disasters, replacement benefits were automatically issued to households in the affected area. HRA chose not to do that this time. Automatic reissuance has the advantage of being quicker and much less work for the administering agency. It also gets benefits to the victims quickly and efficiently, and does not depend on the victims learning about the program and the correct procedure to follow for replacement benefits.

One significant concern with automatic replacement, and likely the reason it was not used in this instance, is the difficulty in correctly identifying the households living in the affected area. In the case of NYC, the affected area was not coterminous with a county boundary. Therefore, it was not possible to tell from the zip code whether a person lived in the affected area or not. However, this might not be a problem in many situations.

Disaster benefit: Households in receipt of food stamps, who resided in the directly impacted area, or resided in the 5 boroughs and were employed in the impacted area, and who lost their source of income, were eligible for a supplementary benefit. This additional benefit was the difference between the household’s regular September allotment and the disaster benefit for the household size. Households could be eligible for both the replacement benefit and the supplement, if all eligibility criteria were met.

Allowances for decreases in household composition: In the 5 NYC boroughs, for households that lost members on September 11, HRA was authorized to determine allotments based on the pre-September 11 household composition until November 30, 2001. This temporarily maintained the food stamp benefit level and meant that it was not considered an overpayment if an HRA center failed to process a reported decrease in the number of people living in the household.

Allowances for increases in household composition: For households in the 5 boroughs that gained members due to displacement as a result of the disaster, HRA was authorized through November to provide a standard benefit of $102 for each person that was added to the household. These households had to confirm each month that the new household member was still there. There was no income or resource test for this allotment and no immigrant status verification requirement.

At the end of November, if the displaced individual was still in the household, the person could be added to the regular food stamp grant. At that time his or her income and resources were considered pursuant to the regular Food Stamp Program rules.

Extended recertification periods: OTDA was granted the authority to extend the certification periods by two months for households residing within the 5 boroughs whose certification expired in September or October.

The WMS system was temporarily unavailable in many offices in and around NYC. However, the system has many functions preprogrammed to go into effect at certain times if no action is taken by a caseworker. A good example of this is the so-called "drop-dead recertification" process. In the Food Stamp Program, unlike most benefits programs, participants are authorized to receive benefits only for a predetermined period of time. Before that time period ends, the person must go to the office for an interview, fill out a "recertification" application form, and prove that they are still eligible to participate. The worker then enters that information into the WMS computer system. With New York City’s unique "drop dead recertification", if the information is not entered, the case automatically closes without any warning to the household.

Naturally, because of the events of September 11, there was concern that necessary data entry and routine appointments would be delayed, causing cases to close due to circumstances beyond the control of participants. Ordinarily, if these actions are not taken they result in both a hardship to the household and quality control (QC) errors attributed to the state. OTDA requested and was granted additional time in which to process routine case actions, in order to make staff available to meet emergency needs and to permit time to catch up with work missed due to the disaster and the WMS service disruptions.

Thus, the automatic case closings system routine was fortunately changed to prevent cases from closing for two months, unless a worker specifically took action to close the case. The centers were able to continue processing recertifications normally during this period if resources permitted. However, they were instructed to handle intake and benefit increases first. If a household got a recertification notice and did not respond, the workers could close the case.

Reporting changes to household circumstances: Ordinarily, when a participant reports a change to household circumstances, the caseworker must process the change within 10 days. The DFSBP waiver extended that time. Caseworkers were instructed to give priority to changes that increased benefits. Workers had to act on changes reported through the end of October by the December food stamp issuance. If acted upon by that date, there would be no quality control error against the state or overpayment claim against the participant. Underpayments resulting from failure to make adjustments upward in a timely fashion were to be restored when the change was ultimately made.

New applicants

Disaster food stamp relief for households not in receipt of food stamp benefits prior to September 11^th: HRA was authorized to issue disaster benefits, equal to the maximum disaster food stamp allotment based on household size, to households living in Manhattan below 14^th Street or living in one of the 5 boroughs and working below 14^th Street at the time of the disaster and who met special income and resource guidelines.

Determining Eligibility for New York’s DFSBP

There were three eligibility criteria for disaster food stamp benefits. In order to be eligible, households had to reside within the 5 boroughs of NYC, the household had to be directly affected by the disaster, and households not formerly in receipt of food stamps had to lack available resources for food. Different benefits were available depending on where the household lived and whether or not the household received food stamp benefits before September 11.

Area of residence and affected by the disaster

Eligibility for any DFSBP benefits was limited to households residing in the 5 boroughs of New York City before or on September 11. In order to receive benefits, these households also had to demonstrate that they were "affected by the disaster."

A decision was made to draw a line at 14th Street for eligibility for replacement benefits. It was assumed, without requiring proof, that people residing and/or working south of 14^th Street were directly affected by the disaster. If a person lived or worked below 14th Street before the disaster, and was in receipt of food stamp benefits, they did not have to show any specific need or harm in order to be eligible for disaster food stamp replacement benefits.

The primary reason for this decision was simplicity. The area below 14th Street was quite broadly affected and, even if a particular person did not lose food due to a power outage or the loss of employment, the feeling was that the lives of everyone in that area were disrupted by the disaster in ways that affected their food needs. The entire area was evacuated, so people were eating outside their homes for varying periods of time. Many were out of their homes for days, weeks, or even months. Some people's homes may have been habitable, but they may have been afraid to return.

As one official put it, "To try to say that some people were more or less deserving of food? Nobody wants to go there. So we applied a geographic definition of who was affected." This obviated any need for officials to judge people's personal decisions about their own circumstances or safety.

This criterion was not always as clear-cut as it seems. For example, there was a store that was located right across the street from the WTC, but its warehouse was in NJ. If a NYC resident reported for work in lower Manhattan, but was employed by the NJ warehouse, were they eligible? What if they drove merchandise from the warehouse to the retail store in Manhattan? What about the limo company whose main office was north of 14th Street, but whose customers were in the financial district? The trade-off for simplicity was inevitably an element of arbitrariness. Employees of shops across the street from each other might both lose their jobs, but the one whose shop was on the south side of 14th Street was eligible for replacement benefits and the one on the north side was not.

While geographic eligibility has been USDA's way of defining the scope of the disaster food stamp program for previous disasters, in no place does the Food Stamp Act require this definition of eligibility according to area of residence. There does not seem to be any legal reason that a person who worked below 14th Street, and was therefore by definition affected by the disaster, had to also live in the declared disaster area of NYC to be eligible for assistance. Although individuals and families residing outside of the relatively small geographic area of NYC were clearly victims of the WTC disaster, the DFSBP did not make disaster relief available for people who lived outside of the confines of the city. It seems that if an individual was affected by the disaster through a connection to the disaster location, such as loss of a job in the affected area, that person could be defined as being "in the affected area." Yet, in this case, "victim of the disaster" was defined as a person residing within NYC at the time of the event, who was also affected by the disaster.

Financial eligibility

Only disaster victims who otherwise lacked resources were eligible for disaster food stamp assistance as new applicants. This was not an issue for current FSP participants, since their need had already been established through the regular FSP application and eligibility determination process. However, for non-food stamp participants applying for disaster food stamps, eligibility standards were established.

The maximum income a household could have to be eligible for disaster food stamps was calculated by adding the maximum net income allowed for the household size in the regular Food Stamp Program, the standard deduction of $134, and the maximum excess shelter deduction of $340. While this formula was less targeted than the more complicated regular food stamp budgeting calculation, it had the advantage of being very simple. [Note: On October 1st, the federal guidelines for both income eligibility and maximum allotments changed, and the DFSBP income eligibility guidelines also changed.]

Eligibility was greatly expanded by a decision that all extraordinary expenses relating to the disaster could be deducted from gross income before applying the income eligibility limit. This could include such expenses as hotel bills, replacement clothing, transportation in and out of the city, etc. Also, only accessible resources were counted. If a person had money in the bank, but they were unable to get to the bank, had lost their ATM card, or the ATM system was not working, that money would not count in determining eligibility for disaster food stamps.

Households whose gross available income and resources for the month of September, after disaster-related expenses were deducted, was at or below the following amounts qualified for assistance:

September 2001 October 2001

2 1412 238 1456 248

3 1654 341 1708 356

4 1895 434 1959 452

5 2137 515 2211 537

6 2379 618 2463 644

7 2620 683 2714 712

8 2862* 781** 2966*** 814****

*plus $242 for each additional household member

**plus $98 for each additional household member

***plus $252 for each additional household member

****plus $102 for each additional household member

Once determined eligible, each household received the maximum allotment for the household size, regardless of their income and resources. This was a one-time issuance for the month of September, but households could reapply for another one-time issuance for the month of October.

Documenting Eligibility for New York’s DFSBP

While everyone shared the goal of providing assistance to the greatest extent possible to affected households, there were also concerns about accountability. As with any publicly funded program, the funds distributed through the disaster food stamp program had to be tracked and officials had to be certain that the benefits were not abused. USDA was concerned about previous experiences in Los Angeles, where there was concern that there was a perception that "they opened up Dodger Stadium and they were just giving food stamps to everyone."

The Food Stamp Program has some of the most comprehensive quality control mechanisms in existence for any government program. In the effort to reduce quality control errors, local social services districts must document every item of information affecting eligibility and the level of benefits for which a household is eligible. They maintain very complete records of this documentation for review by QC examiners. Relative to the size of the benefit, the FSP probably has the most stringent documentation requirements of any federal benefit program.

In the regular FSP, verification is required of every item that can affect eligibility, such as household size and composition, housing costs, date of birth and citizen status of each household member, income, and work activities of each household member. These documentation requirements are impossible to meet in situations where households may be displaced and do not have records readily available to them. It also makes processing applications very slow and prevents many eligible households from receiving benefits.

In order to ensure that households in crisis can receive the disaster food stamp benefit, the statute permits USDA to waive documentation requirements as appropriate for the situation. In this case, only identity had to be established, and where possible, residence, household composition, and, if questionable, food loss, were verified.

Since DFSBP application processing and benefit issuance were done essentially in the same way as for regular food stamp cases, record keeping was not a problem. The only difference between a disaster case and a regular food stamp case was the code that identified which center issued the benefit.

Early on there were concerns about duplicate issuances. Some officials feared that people would go to both centers, apply twice, and open two disaster food stamp cases. This fear turned out to be unfounded. A subsequent comparison was done, and revealed that duplicate issuances were not a problem. There were a few duplicate benefits early on because of the disruption to access to the WMS, but that problem was soon resolved. The Office of the Inspector General is expected to do an audit to confirm this preliminary finding.

Issuing Benefits

The Food Stamp Act does not permit alternative methods of issuing benefits, such as by issuing vouchers or cash, but it is possible that current law still permits using the food stamp coupons. However, transporting coupons would have created difficulty, since they are no longer normally available in New York State. Also, coupons will no longer be printed at all once all states convert to EBT, which is required by law to be done by October 2002. Therefore, using coupons is not a viable option for future disasters. One of the strengths of the DFSBP is that it uses the systems that are already in place to distribute benefits, and there is an advantage to working out the difficulties involved in using the EBT system.

Also, there are disadvantages both to using vouchers and cashing-out, the two alternative measures sometimes discussed. Vouchers are more administratively burdensome, and require that a new process be developed for issuance and redemption. Also, venders may be affected by the disaster too and need to be paid quickly. The option of cashing-out benefits would have been more attractive, since HRA had the capacity to write checks. But, there are disadvantages to that, as well, not the least of which is that the cash can be spent on anything and is not necessarily used to meet food needs, thus defeating the purpose of the program.

As a result, USDA advised OTDA that no alternative method of issuance, including food stamp coupons, was possible. Benefits had to be issued via EBT cards - the only system currently in use in New York State. OTDA representatives expressed a desire to have greater flexibility.

In New York State, the EBT system is the responsibility of OTDA, which contracts with Citibank to operate the system. Citibank in turn subcontracts some of the hardware and training obligations to American Computer Services (ACS, formerly Lockheed-Martin). Thus, OTDA, Citibank, and ACS all share responsibilities in the operation of the EBT system.

With EBT, food stamp coupons were eliminated, and all benefits are accessed through an on-line electronic system similar to that used by credit card companies. Unfortunately, the system depends on having both electricity and telephone access to the database. When a retailer loses either electricity or phone service, they lose their capacity to process electronic transactions, including food stamp transactions.

Even if a retailer had electricity and phone service, they might be unable to process EBT transactions if their service provider was out of service. Many retailers participating in the Food Stamp Program had contracts with service providers that ran their networks through Verizon. These retailers lost access to the database, and therefore could not process EBT transactions electronically.

Under normal circumstances, when EBT transactions are not possible due to computer or power failures, retailers are supposed to use a manual system, but a telephone is still necessary to confirm the availability of funds. Advocates have always complained that the retailers are unfamiliar with the manual process, and that many simply stop processing EBT transactions rather than use the manual system when there is a power failure. On September 11th and in the following days, the number of electronic transactions dropped dramatically. City Harvest, which operates an ongoing hunger hotline, for example, got 300 calls that week from food stamp participants having EBT problems.

Following September 11, Citibank immediately tried to identify which vendors were having problems by checking the transactions reports. They then tried to call every vendor in the five boroughs that had not processed a transaction. They visited the ones they were unable to contact by phone. For those vendors who were having problems, a variety of solutions were tried. Citicorp's main line for some regions, mostly Brooklyn and lower Manhattan, was down. Those retailers were given an alternative number that was routed around the problem area. For other retailers, the problem was with their own phone service, which was up and down. A few had no communications at all. Without phone service to the vendor, it was impossible to process an electronic transaction, and relying on a manual voucher can be risky for the vendor.

OTDA and USDA quickly set up an alternative process for vendors without phone access. Under this process, USDA guaranteed $25 per household per day. Thus, if a vendor accepted a manual voucher and it turned out that there was no money in the food stamp account, the vendor would still receive up to $25. This is one area in which OTDA had excellent communications with advocates, who were able to get word out to their clients and retailers in their neighborhoods. There were initial concerns that people might abuse the $25 per day guarantee by spending money they did not have in their food stamp accounts. However, no such problems have been identified.

OTDA reports that after an initial drop of a few days, usage was almost back to normal. OTDA tracked usage in a single zip code, and within that geographic area, saw very little change. Advocates reported neighborhoods where access was poor, and particular retailers that were not accepting EBT, but this was apparently localized. While a number of retailers did not use EBT for a period of time, or were completely closed for a while, OTDA theorizes that people found the stores in the area that were processing EBT benefits and shopped there.

It took a few weeks to get everybody processing again, with the exception of a few retailers around the WTC, who used the emergency voucher process until late November. Outside lower Manhattan most areas were stabilized by October 15th.

Advocates reported that some stores posted "No Food Stamps" signs into November. However, OTDA says they did not receive such reports. They point out that some retailers had unstable phone service into November, and may not have been processing EBT transactions all the time. Since some stores do not process an EBT transaction every day, OTDA would not know if there was a brief lapse in processing transactions.

Even the Best Laid Plans Require Outreach

Once plans were in place for the disaster food stamp program, neither the state nor the city actively publicized the availability of disaster food stamp benefits. Even advocates had a difficult time getting information about what plans and procedures were in place.

It was not until Wednesday, September 19^th, that advocates had the information necessary to become active and begin to distribute information and flyers about the many disaster relief programs, including disaster food stamps. None of the staff at NYC Red Cross centers were aware of the DFSBP. In fact, some did not know about the existence of the disaster assistance center offices.

FEMA information never included the DFSBP. Their hotline referred requests for food assistance to the Red Cross. When FEMA started going door-to-door in Battery Park City with disaster relief information, advocates asked USDA to work with FEMA to make sure that DFSBP information was included, but the DFSBP information was never provided.

The Community Food Resource Center (CFRC), a not-for-profit anti-hunger organization serving New York City, did extensive outreach. In addition to their usual food stamp outreach work with emergency food providers, they contacted unions representing low-wage workers. They provided information about disaster food stamps and ongoing assistance and prescreened for potential eligibility.

City Harvest, NYC’s food rescue organization, and the New York City Coalition Against Hunger, which works with faith-based emergency food providers, sent e-mails and flyers to their member organizations. Yet, many people in the food pantries did not get the word. Other city groups spread the word about the program throughout their service networks. Literally hundreds of community based organizations (CBOs) distributed flyers and referred their clients to the program. Some ethnic-based CBOs translated information into the languages of their clients.

Many advocates tried to get city, state, and federal officials to mention the DFSBP in their comments to the media or regular briefings. The Mayor’s daily briefings to the press would have brought a lot of attention to the program, but he never mentioned it.

USDA told advocates that they were speaking with OTDA about the lack of outreach. OTDA addressed the question in its September 27^th request for an extension of the DFSBP, summarizing their efforts as follows:

The only specific outreach that was done by OTDA or HRA was a contact with the Labor Council. The two hotlines mentioned were not publicized, so people only called if they were already familiar with HRA’s and OTDA’s services. USDA’s reply to OTDA’s letter stated, "We encourage your agency and the New York City Human Resources Administration to continue efforts to inform the public of the availability of the disaster benefits…" But, no other outreach was done.

There was a general consensus by everyone outside of the advocacy community that advocates did a good job of getting the word out. Advocates are less positive about their own role, since they are very aware of what was not done due to lack of resources and inattention from the media. In time, word did get around as a result of the effort of advocates and word of mouth.

Implementing the Approved DFSBP in NYC

Once the initial waivers were approved, implementation of the disaster food stamp program was left to NYC’s HRA to coordinate with the other disaster relief efforts spearheaded by the city and FEMA. USDA continued to provide technical assistance mainly in the form of offering guidance about what was permissible under the law and suggestions about factors the state should take into consideration.

Identifying a location

Two of the most important decisions that had to be made before victims could receive disaster food stamp assistance were choosing the location(s) for people to apply for benefits and figuring out how to adequately staff the site(s). The location had to be accessible, secure, and spacious. Since the goal of the DFSBP is to process benefits for people as quickly as possible, room for the adequate flow of traffic was very important. Staff had to be arranged in a way that enabled applicants to move through the process quickly in an orderly fashion. In light of the heightened security concerns, a balance had to be achieved between the location being big enough to handle the flow of people, but not so big that it could not be controlled and ensure safety. Also the equipment and EBT cards had to be secure.

As it turned out, setting up locations with the necessary infrastructure was a Herculean task, handled primarily by city staff. The first assistance center was located at Pier 94 on the west side of Manhattan. It was initially intended to be a family service center for family members of the missing people, but was also staffed to provide various forms of assistance to those families, in order to enable them to receive all services in one location.

One state official suggested that co-locating the family service center, which was primarily set up to provide services related to mourning, bereavement and the identification of bodies, and the assistance center, where benefits were provided, was a mistake - a lesson learned from TWA 800. Family bereavement and identification of victims is simply too traumatic, and needs to be separated from the "process" of getting benefits. He suggested that volunteers could serve as liaisons to take the forms filled out at the family center to the assistance center for processing. However, HRA wanted to provide "one-stop shopping" with FEMA, and elected to provide all services at one location.

The Pier was an ideal location under many of the criteria for choosing facilities. Due to the nature of the waterfront location and the warehousing for which it was built, there was only one way in and out. This made security very easy, and there were large open spaces, which could be divided as needed. Although it was not readily accessible to public transportation, this was seen as an advantage, because it provided some privacy for the families. Pier 94 was about a 15-minute walk from the nearest subway stop, and families were also shuttled there from the Armory, where the families gathered during the first week.

HRA got Pier 94 wired within 24 hours. Everyone agreed that they did a great job getting the site up and running, especially under the circumstances. They co-located FEMA and the voluntary agencies, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army, with HRA services. By Monday, September 17th, HRA was taking DFSBP applications.

HRA relied on staff from their domestic violence and emergency services divisions, HEAP, the emergency heat line, and emergency food office. These staff members had worked on other disasters, such as snow emergencies, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and encephalitis. Later, personnel from other departments were called upon to write checks and enter application registrations into the WMS system.

Processing applicants at Pier 94

For applicants of any form of assistance, including disaster food stamps, the first step in the process was to complete an initial interview with a FEMA representative. The FEMA interview gathered all the basic information once, so it did not have to be repeated for every agency the applicant would visit. The intake interview also served as an orientation for people who had no idea what services were available. FEMA referred applicants to each agency that might be able to help them, including HRA.

HRA determined the applicants’ eligibility for disaster food stamps, disaster Medicaid, childcare, and emergency assistance. Perhaps most importantly, HRA had a checkbook. If a need was identified and there was not a program available to meet the need, or there would be a delay in receiving benefits, HRA would write a check.

Many people emphasized the importance of having such funds available. A state representative explained that New York State is unusual in that the Governor has no disaster fund. In most states, he said, there is a fund available for the Governor to use at his discretion in emergencies. It could be available for many of the kinds of needs that HRA met using city resources at the assistance centers. A USDA representative also emphasized the importance of having a checkbook available. She pointed out that it proved vital in Maine, where the Governor did have such an emergency fund.

Most days at Pier 94, applications were processed that day. This was possible because staff stayed until the work was done, often working 18-hour days, 7 days a week. Pier 94 stayed open past midnight, sometimes until two or three in the morning, and reopening just a few hours later. "All the agencies worked so well together, there was never a raised voice," said a city official.

At the same time, there were "labyrinthine chains of command". Two separate chains of command existed, one governed traffic flow and the other determined eligibility. Some felt that they did not always communicate well. The person in charge for each organization present at the site attended daily meetings. A federal official said that state officials had to "knock heads to get them to talk to each other," while a city official agreed that OTDA played an "important role" at these meetings. Whatever challenges were presented by the dual chains of command, they did not seem to adversely affect the service provided to disaster food stamp applicants.

At first, it took 3 or 4 days to get an activated EBT card to the applicant. And, it took 4 people: one to do the assessment, one to determine benefits (sometimes the same person), one to register the application in the computer system, which could be done on-site. Once the file was complete, it had to be carried by a fourth person to a food stamp office or to the management information systems office for data entry into the WMS system, which was connected to the state’s EBT system. The file would then go back to Pier 94 for card activation and benefit issuance to the applicant. It took about 10 days before data entry could be done on site. After that, one caseworker could do the whole thing.

USDA stationed auditors at Pier 94 almost as soon as the DFSBP began. This caused some additional stress. City staff, who had been working long hours under great stress since the event the week before, felt that the auditors "were there to criticize, looking for mistakes." In later conversations, USDA pointed out that it is the nature of the job that the auditors are separate and not part of the team effort, since they do not serve clients. Yet, the truth remains that USDA felt the need to send in auditors, when other federal programs, such as the far more expensive Medicaid program did not. This may be explained by the fact that the FSP is a 100% federally funded program, whereas state and local governments pay a substantial share of Medicaid.

HRA Opens 180 Water Street

Since the Pier was intended only to provide services to family members of missing people, FEMA & HRA opened an assistance center at 180 Water Street on Wednesday, September 19^th in order to serve the other victims of the disaster. The building at 180 Water Street houses HRA’s main offices in lower Manhattan, so it was a readily available location.

The same process for applying for disaster relief benefits was set up at 180 Water Street as at the Pier. HRA maintained its policy of writing checks for needs that were not met quickly enough through other means. In fact, HRA dispensed more such funds at 180 Water Street, because volunteer agencies did not organize as quickly there as at Pier 94.

141 Worth Street Takes the Place of 180 Water Street

The 180 Water Street site was too small. It was immediately apparent that another, larger site was needed to serve the displaced. Therefore, FEMA opened an assistance center at 141 Worth Street, and 180 Water Street was shut down. However, HRA’s initiative in opening 180 Water Street was important because it identified the need for a separate location and it began serving displaced victims.

FEMA was ultimately in charge at 141 Worth Street. The same practice as at Pier 94 of conducting an up-front screening and orientation for all applicants before directing them to tables for direct assistance was instituted. However, the 141 Worth Street center was significantly different from Pier 94 in a number of respects. First, it served a much larger group of potential clients. Pier 94 was intended only for the families of missing people, a more limited number of households. On the other hand, 141 Worth Street served the entire population of lower Manhattan, tens of thousands of households. At the same time, 141 Worth Street did not stay open late, as Pier 94 did. Not having the intensive grieving and identification of victims to accommodate, it was a more traditional assistance center, designed only to handle the "process" of delivering benefits to disaster victims.

Within a few days it became clear that more people were arriving than could be handled. In order to save people from waiting all day and then not being seen, FEMA began making return appointments. As time went by, these appointments stretched further and further into the future, until they were weeks, even months, away.

While this may have been acceptable for FEMA and the programs of voluntary agencies located at 141 Worth Street, it contradicted the emergency nature of disaster food stamps. The DFSBP usually serves thousands of people a day, for just a few days or weeks. In fact, according to USDA, this is precisely why the DFSBP usually does not co-locate with FEMA. The sheer volume of applicants the DFSBP processes can overwhelm a FEMA site. While FEMA and the voluntary agencies might spend significant time with each victim, evaluating their losses and needs, the DFSBP can process an applicant, give them an EBT card, and have them on their way to buy food in five or ten minutes.

The extended waiting period at 141 Worth Street was "totally beyond the pale", according to a USDA official. As soon as the problem became evident, HRA should have begun setting up other sites.

People who arrived at 141 Worth Street seeking disaster assistance before the DFSBP ended at the end of October were still evaluated for disaster food stamps when they returned for their appointments, which stretched to the end of December. In the meantime, people who first applied for disaster assistance on November 1 or after were not eligible for disaster food stamps, since the program had ended. They were sent to the nearest food stamp center to apply for regular food stamps. According to USDA officials, this situation where applications were still being processed for an extended period of time after new applications were no longer being taken, was completely unprecedented.

HRA stayed at the FEMA site, and saw the applicants that returned at their appointment times, although only about half returned. On its website, USDA speculated, "It appears that many of the individuals who were given appointments weeks into the future at Worth Street went down to Pier 94, applied, and had their applications processed more timely." It is also possible that some people simply did not bother with disaster food stamps and sought food assistance from other sources.

Coordinating between Pier 94 and 141 Worth Street

Initially, the two locations did not have linked computer databases, so there was some concern that one site would not know what the other was doing in any particular case. However, all cases were entered into WMS, so it seems that duplicate cases should not have been possible. One worker at 141 Worth Street reported that applicants would sometimes say they got benefits at Pier 94, but it would not show up on the computer. Sometimes there were delays or problems in data entry, so this is possible. However, the benefit card was not activated until the case information was entered. If the same information were entered at another site, the duplication would appear. Therefore, it seems unlikely that duplicate benefits were actually issued.

Data entry apparently remained a problem throughout the program’s implementation. It was weeks before data could be entered into the WMS system at both sites. Until then, the files had to be transported to a separate data entry site, which was inconvenient and prevented the benefits from being issued immediately. Even when data entry was available on-site, there were often backlogs.

Initially, Pier 94 was supposed to be for family members of missing persons. However, when displaced victims appeared at Pier 94 seeking assistance, they were not turned away. Thus, while families were always given a higher priority than displaced people, Pier 94 also turned into an assistance center. This left the family members without a separate family center, which could provide the privacy that identification and grief counseling require.

In late November, the Mayor's office made the decision to separate the two functions at Pier 94. A number of changes were then made. The area was physically divided, so that benefits applications and processing took place on the right-hand side of the room, while family members went to the left. Separate entrances provided access to the two sides, but once inside it was possible to move between the two parts of the room. This was presumably for the convenience of family members who might still be processing applications for assistance.

Many advocates felt that this created a division between the "special" victims, who had lost family members, and "second-class" victims, who were "only displaced". In fact, this distinction had been made from the beginning, with the creation of two separate centers for the two groups, but it became very clear when the restructuring took place. Around the same time, security measures changed. In addition to public and private security officers, metal detectors were brought in to the site. These changes decreased the perceived accessibility of the services.

Ending the Program

By all reports, the decision to end the DFSBP at the end of October was a mutual one. HRA and OTDA agreed that it should end, and both agencies were of the opinion that USDA wanted it to end sooner rather than later. When the last waiver period ended on October 31st, no new extension was requested.

From the beginning, USDA made it clear that the DFSBP should be very short. An OTDA representative explained that because the regular Food Stamp Program was back on its feet to take new applications, the state got the sense from USDA that the disaster program should end rather than continue like disaster UIB, FEMA, etc. However, this did not take into account the fact that thousands of affected people had never applied for the benefits because they were not aware of the program and had not yet gone to the assistance centers.

Advocates were not informed that the program officially ended, and many continued to refer people to the disaster food stamp program or expected their clients to get disaster food stamps with other disaster benefits when they referred them to the assistance centers. Many advocates felt that the program ended too soon. Some HRA staff also thought the DFSBP should continue, since the other disaster benefits, including HRA assistance, were continuing.

Many people did not get disaster food stamp benefits because they did not know they were available. Also, many displaced people did not come forward to seek assistance because they either felt that those who had lost family members should get assistance first, or because they were trying to get by on savings and help from friends and family. In early January, people were still appearing at the assistance centers. FEMA reported seeing around 500 new applicants every day.

The DFSBP ended effective October 31st, and no new applications were taken after that date. Applications of people who had come to 141 Worth St., but had not been seen were still processed when they returned. The last of these applications were processed by the end of December.

The Transition to Ongoing Benefits

The regular Food Stamp Program is greatly underutilized by eligible households that do not receive cash assistance. Research shows that this is primarily due to households' beliefs that they are not eligible and the onerous documentation requirements of the program. Another recent study showed that 72% of eligible, non-participating households stated that the primary reason they did not participate was that they thought they were not eligible for food stamps.

Many people who were eligible for disaster food stamps are not eligible for regular food stamps. The DFSBP took into account extraordinary expenses, had higher income eligibility guidelines, and did not delve into the complicated rules that limit participation by, for example, many legal immigrants, strikers, and students. It also did not use the complex FSP budgeting process, which does not take into account the full housing costs of most applicants.

However, many of the people applying for disaster food stamps were probably eligible for ongoing assistance. Even if they were not eligible before the disaster, many of them probably became eligible in the months following the disaster, as they lost their jobs or had reduced income. Households receiving disaster food stamps seem to be at risk of having ongoing difficulty meeting their nutritional needs and should be encouraged to use the FSP.

All disaster food stamp applicants were given a list of the food stamp centers, so they could apply at the nearest center. Advocates offered to provide information on the Food Stamp Program to disaster food stamp applicants at 141 Worth Street and Pier 94. However, perhaps due to the poor relationship between advocates and HRA, their efforts were unsuccessful. Disaster food stamp applicants were not effectively given information about the application process or eligibility guidelines for ongoing food stamps. It is very difficult to do outreach to disaster food stamp participants after the fact because they were in unstable living environments. The addresses they gave on their applications were unlikely to be accurate later.

An advocacy group that provides information about the FSP to the general public and assists people through the application process reports worked with some disaster food stamp participants who were seeking ongoing benefits. These applicants, having experienced the streamlined procedures at 141 Worth Street and Pier 94, were shocked at the difficulty of the application process and the poor treatment they received at the HRA food stamp centers. One such applicant is quoted as saying "Where did the nice people go?"

One applicant who had been working at the World Trade Center had just bought a car, and was told at the food stamp center that the car made the household ineligible for food stamps. This was incorrect, since the car was exempt under new food stamp rules. "It turned out OK, because the center just didn't know the rule," said the advocate, "But that's how it is at the centers. You get misinformation. You get the runaround. At Pier 94 and 141 Worth Street, they got correct information, and they got the benefits they were entitled to."

An advocate leader suggested that the regular Food Stamp Program should emulate the DFSBP, rather than the other way around. "Use disaster food stamps to learn about the Food Stamp Program generally," he said. "You can be polite and efficient and the roof won't fall in."

The DFSBP and the regular FSP have opposite approaches to eligibility and documentation issues. In the disaster setting, the focus is on getting benefits out to eligible people and keeping the best possible records in the process. The regular FSP, on the other hand, is focused on documenting every item affecting eligibility and budgeting before issuing any benefits, and never taking a risk that someone might get a little more than they were entitled to receive.

How Many Benefited from the DFSBP?

Benefits under the program were first issued on September 17 and the last new application for assistance was accepted for filing on October 31. While no new applications were accepted after October 31, slightly more than 1,200 applications were processed for approval between November 1 and December 31. (See Attachment 3 at the end of this report.)

By the end of the disaster food stamp benefit program, approximately 12,000 households received more than $3.8 million in food stamp benefits and an additional 3,430 households received nearly $276,000 in replacement and supplemental benefits. Also, slightly fewer than 2,000 DFSBP applications were denied from September 17th until December 31st.

The majority of the benefits were issued to households who filed applications at Pier 94 (6,762 of the 11,962 applications), and most of the applications were filed and approved in the month of October. (Detail on the denials by site is not available.) Just under 2,000 applications were filed for approval in September, and another 6,900 in October. However, it is pertinent to note that more than 1,000 disaster benefits were issued to more than 1,200 households after October 31, due to delays in processing applications. Also, while original estimates noted that up to 10,000 households were receiving food stamps and living below 14^th Street, only 3,500 applied for replacement/supplemental benefits.

Recommendations for Future DFSBPs

The problem of area eligibility.

The most important lesson learned from NYC’s experience is that when requesting waivers to implement a DFSBP, states should ask for flexibility to allow all households impacted by the disaster to be potentially eligible for benefits. The program as defined in the Food Stamp Act is very broad. It gives USDA virtually unlimited authority to provide benefits to disaster victims. Yet the parameters USDA established for the NYC disaster unnecessarily denied benefits to many households that were affected by the disaster economically, simply because they did not reside within the five boroughs of New York City. Because of the geographic limitation imposed on eligibility, many needy households were denied access to the food benefits they needed, and HRA spent New York City funds to assist non-city residents, rather than turn them away without the means to buy food.

To make the DFSBP as effective as possible, USDA should grant program administrators the greatest degree of flexibility possible for determining eligibility. DFSBP caseworkers should be primarily concerned with getting services to people in need. They should not have to worry about being second-guessed or charged with quality control errors. In a crisis situation, supporting the stressed and overworked case staff should take priority over payment accuracy concerns.

One of the purposes for expanding eligibility for food stamps for disaster victims is because people who may have been getting by before the disaster may not be able to do so after an emergency strikes. Likewise, people whose need arises suddenly from a disaster should not be required to exhaust all of their resources (i.e. spend all savings and cash in IRAs) as is required by the regular Food Stamp Program.

Perhaps the greatest perceived problem with the eligibility criteria in the NYC disaster was in the geographic definition of "victims of the disaster." HRA and OTDA wanted to extend benefits to all households affected economically by the disaster, regardless of their residence. However, USDA interpreted the statute to mean that people affected by the disaster had to live within the five boroughs of NYC in order to be eligible for DFSBP. This interpretation resulted in needy households being denied benefits. For example, two people worked at a restaurant below 14th street. Both lost their jobs when the restaurant shut down. One commuted from Queens (within the 5 boroughs) and the other from Nassau County (outside the 5 boroughs). Because of where they lived, one was eligible for disaster food stamps and the other was not. In fact, even if the person living in Queens did not lose his job, he was still eligible because he works in the affected area. He was less harmed by the disaster, but was eligible while the Nassau County person who did lose his job was ineligible.

This problem crossed state lines, as well. Many employees in lower Manhattan commuted from New Jersey or Connecticut, which did not have DFSBPs. These households, especially if they had lost a family member in the disaster, were receiving other kinds of assistance in NYC, but were not eligible for disaster food stamps because of their place of residence.

HRA, administering the program at the assistance centers, did not want to turn these people away, but could not give them disaster food stamps either. As a result, HRA reports that it issued checks funded by NYC to these households because they were not city residents and could not get the federal disaster food stamp benefits.

Admittedly, the statute when written took into consideration the usual types of natural disasters, the traditional floods, hurricanes, and ice storms that have occurred in areas where the residences and centers of commerce affected could be more easily defined by existing geographic boundaries. At the same time, the drafters apparently understood that disasters are unpredictable. They therefore drafted the provision very broadly in order to give USDA enough discretion to provide benefits as appropriate in unforeseen situations, such as occurred in New York City.

Furthermore, as time went on, the President extended the declared disaster area. On September 28^th, the Presidential declaration was extended to include a number of counties surrounding NYC. For these counties, FEMA authorized emergency assistance to reimburse expenses for individuals and businesses that suffered damage as a direct result of the disaster, and to provide for emergency protective measures.

Since residents of the surrounding counties had been excluded from receiving disaster food stamps on the basis of their residency, the state hoped to be able to make them eligible once the defined disaster area included them. However, USDA told OTDA that eligibility would not be expanded because the level of emergency declared for the surrounding counties was not as severe as the level of disaster in New York City. Months later, a USDA official in Washington speculated that the reason the outlying counties were not eligible for the DFSBP was because there was no disruption in the normal channels of food distribution in those areas, as required by the Food Stamp Act. But, the authority in the Food Stamp Act is very broad and another interpretation was also an option.

The confusion around the emergency declarations and scope of eligibility for the DFSBP is disturbing. Given USDA's stated position that the people on the ground know best what is going on, it seems logical that those people should have been clearly advised about the criteria so that they could make good decisions about what assistance to request. Yet, the state and local agencies in this case did not even know that they could question the area of eligibility definition. As a result, they did not request a broader designation of eligibility, and they were unable to provide federal assistance to victims that lived outside the five boroughs of New York City. As a result, local resources were used to assist these households in dire need.

Many people, including advocates and officials at every level of government have expressed dismay that people in the outlying counties who lost their source of income in the disaster could not get assistance. The program should allow people directly affected by the disaster to get the needed disaster benefits, regardless of where they live. State and county residence should not have mattered so much. In this case, the interpretation of the Food Stamp Act was too narrow to serve the needs of a great number of disaster victims, and should be carefully reconsidered in the future to provide more discretion in defining the group of people eligible for benefits.

Do not end the program before need subsides / Operate more efficiently

The decision to end the program should be predicated on a determination that eligible people are sufficiently recovered from the disaster to the point that the assistance is no longer needed.

USDA's reluctance to extend the period of time benefits were available when the affect of the disaster was purely economic is understandable, since it may be years, if ever, that many of the low wage workers who lost their means of self support in this disaster would become self supporting again. However, since the other disaster benefits were continuing, and since many displaced people did not come forward to seek assistance at first, the termination of benefits in the NYC case before most of the victims had even come forward to request assistance was premature.

An approach similar to the one taken by Medicaid seems to make more sense. The Disaster Medical Assistance Program (DMAP) granted benefits for an initial 4-month period. Before the end of the four months, the household had an appointment with the appropriate HRA office to determine eligibility for ongoing benefits. This acknowledges that the impact of the disaster is at least a few months, and that administratively some time is required to catch up with full determinations of eligibility. The DFSBP gave only one month's benefit at a time, as if it is possible for most people to recover within a month. To receive a second month’s worth of benefits, people had to reapply in October. After that, the program ended. The DMAP also extended the recertification periods of all MA participants for one year. DFSBP on the other hand, required individuals to continue appearing for recertification appointments.

Do not forget outreach

Lack of awareness about the program was a major reason why many needy families did not apply for assistance. To better get the word out, FEMA should work with the USDA to integrate food assistance generally and the DFSBP specifically into the overall disaster response, and FEMA should include information about the DFSBP during intake interviews and in the various pieces of literature distributed by FEMA. Also, the DFSBP should be publicized separately from other disaste